October 23, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4595 • 4596  • 

Johnson's Russia List
#4596
23 October 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russian region poll ruled valid despite controversy.
2. Bloomberg: United Financial Group's Fyodorov on Russian Stocks.
3. Interfax: Russian ex-premier confirms plans to sue US presidential 
candidate Bush.
4. Itar-Tass: Conference on information security, mass media held in 
Russia.
5. Izvestia: PUTIN EXHORTS CHUBAIS AND VYAKHIREV TO MAKE PEACE.
6. The Russia Journal: Vladimir Mukhin, What fate for alternative 
service in Russia? Many claim it’s guaranteed in Constitution.
7. Moscow Times: Peter Ekman, Academic Excellence in School 132.
8. ECOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: Grigorii Pasko, Dictatorship of the Law?
THEY'RE STILL LOOKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SPIES IN VLADIVOSTOK.
9. Business Week: Janin Friend, Letter From Armenia. Abandoning a 
Sinking Country.
10. The Brookings Review: Fiona Hill, Russia: The U.S. Response to 
Changing Policy Imperatives.
11. The Washington Post: David Hoffman, Putin Displays More Cautious 
Leadership. Role in Kursk, Mideast Crises Recast Russian's Bold Image.]

******


#1
Russian region poll ruled valid despite controversy

MOSCOW, Oct 23 (Reuters) - An election for governor of Russia's southwestern 
Kursk region was declared valid on Monday despite fears that turnout might be 
hit by the controversial last-minute exclusion of incumbent Alexander 
Rutskoi. 


An official from the Kursk election commission contacted by telephone said 
the turnout at the gubernatorial polls held on Sunday was nearly 58 percent, 
above the required 50 percent. 


Officials said on Sunday that three hours before the end of voting turnout 
was only 41 percent. 


However, neither of the two leading candidates -- Communist Alexander 
Mikhailov and President Vladimir Putin's envoy in the region, Viktor 
Surzhikov -- managed to secure the 50-percent support needed for an outright 
win. 


A second-round vote will take place on November 5. 


Rutskoi, a former Russian vice president who led a revolt in 1993 against 
then Kremlin leader Boris Yeltsin, has questioned the legitimacy of the polls 
after a regional court ruled on Saturday to bar him from the race. 


The court accused Rutskoi of misreporting his property and of abusing his 
official position to help his campaign. 


Rutskoi, who plans to appeal against the ruling, described the court decision 
as a conspiracy against him. He had warned that it could disrupt voting, but 
no major problems were reported. 


The head of Russia's Central Election Commission, Alexander Veshnyakov, 
warned local election officials against trying to boycott the polls and said 
any such action could be punished by up to five years in prison. 


Rutskoi, who was amnestied for his role in the failed 1993 revolt, has lately 
fallen out of favour with the Kremlin. 


Kremlin officials accuse him of poor management of the region. His supporters 
say Rutskoi infuriated Putin with an initiative to help the families of 118 
sailors who died when the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sank in August. 


Putin faced a barrage of public criticism for not breaking his holiday during 
the drama in the Arctic Barents Sea. 


******


#2
United Financial Group's Fyodorov on Russian Stocks: Comment

Moscow, Oct. 23 (Bloomberg)
-- The following are comments by Boris Fyodorov, honorary chairman of 
United Financial Group and former Russian tax minister, on investors and the 
outlook for Russian stocks. 


Fyodorov spoke in an interview with Bloomberg News. 


On inexperienced investors: 


``I would say that it's much rarer now than before, although sometimes you 
feel that all of a sudden there is another bunch of investors who have never 
been to Russia before appearing out of nowhere and have been convinced at 
some conference to buy something. Then a few weeks later there is some crazy 
frequency announcement like this frequency from Vimpelcom and they 
immediately sell. Those who have been here long enough understand that there 
will be another announcement tomorrow.'' 


On Russian President Vladimir Putin: 


``If Putin continues in the way he has started -- the situation is stable and 
controlled -- I think next year we could have a major, major boost in the 
market. It is clear that Putin is so far behaving better than people 
expected, is more able than people expected. Slowly people will realize that, 
notwithstanding all these scandals, Russia is moving in the right direction 
and that there is a huge window of opportunity.'' 


On when stocks will soar: 


``This is a gut feeling but next year could be a major change of attitude 
towards Russia, but more professional than 1997 and 1998.'' 


******


#3
Russian ex-premier confirms plans to sue US presidential candidate Bush 
Interfax 


Moscow, 23rd October: The former Russian prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
has confirmed his intention to sue the Republican US presidential candidate, 
George Bush Jr., over Bush's recent allegations that IMF funds allocated to 
Russia had been misappropriated by a number of high-ranking Russian 
officials. 


"Today I will have a meeting with lawyers, and in the near future the lawsuit 
will be prepared," Chernomyrdin told Interfax on Monday [23rd October]. 


On the subject of the recent press reports, whose authors accused the former 
prime minister of misappropriating some of the IMF funds, Chernomyrdin said: 
"Only sick people are writing about this. This all is complete nonsense and 
rubbish." 


*******


#4
Conference on information security, mass media held in Russia 
ITAR-TASS 


Moscow, 23rd October: The conceptual framework of information security, 
worked out by the Russian Security Council and approved by the president, may 
promote a dialogue between the authorities and the press, Anatoliy Streltsov, 
deputy head of the Information Security Department in the staff of the 
Russian Security Council and one of the authors of the doctrine, said on 
Monday [23rd October]. 


He spoke at the first all-Russia conference, whose topic is "Russian mass 
media: information security market". One of the objectives set for itself by 
the conference is the creation of a data bank for shaping state policy in the 
sphere of mass media and the formation of the most effective basis for 
cooperation between press services of ministries and agencies, on the one 
hand, and the mass media, on the other. 


Streltsov admitted that journalists were not satisfied with the level of 
their cooperation with state bodies. But state bodies are equally 
dissatisfied with their cooperation with mass media organs. The main problem 
analysed in the doctrine is the relationship between the mass media and the 
authorities. It contains ideas on the need for maintaining the independence 
of the mass media and, at the same time, for providing the state with a 
possibility to inform the public of its stand on various issues. 


******


#5
Izvestia
October 23, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PUTIN EXHORTS CHUBAIS AND VYAKHIREV TO MAKE PEACE
By Olga GUBENKO

President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation 
conferred with RAO UES (Unified Energy Systems) board chairman 
Anatoly Chubais and Gazprom chief executive officer Rem 
Vyakhirev in Sochi the other day, compelling both men to 
establish a joint gas-energy commission. By all looks, the 
President no longer intends to personally settle all those 
endless conflicts between the two Russian natural monopolists.

The Sochi conference, which involved Vladimir Putin, 
Anatoly Chubais, Rem Vyakhirev, as well as Deputy Prime 
Minister Viktor Khristenko in charge of the fuel-and-energy 
sector, made it possible to conclude a peace pact. However, 
this result could be predicted well in advance. The presence of 
Chubais and Khristenko prevented Vyakhirev, who wanted to meet 
Putin tete-a-tete, from lobbying sectoral interests. This time, 
however, both Vyakhirev and Chubais promptly reported on their 
sectoral performance, apparently trying hard to be up to the 
mark and to avoid any criticism on Putin's part. Their reports 
imply that Russia will receive heat and electricity without 
interruption during the forthcoming heating season. We are 
completely ready for the winter season; and everything is 
tip-top, Chubais stressed. True, this was made possible by 
boiler-oil and coal purchases, for the most part.
Consequently, Chubais once again reminded Putin about the 
usefulness of his company's policy with regard to all those, 
who default on their payments. Such a policy enables RAO UES to 
scoop additional hard cash, subsequently using such monies to 
buy fuel all the same. We have stockpiled more than 100 percent 
of the required boiler-oil amounts at our power plants, Chubais 
pointed out. According to Chubais, the situation with coal is a 
bit worse; however, we are not worried in this connection, he 
added. 
Meanwhile Gazprom solemnly promises to ensure 
uninterrupted gas deliveries, that is, throughout the 
forthcoming heating season, to say the least. Vyakhirev 
suggested ending all those verbal squabbles and tackling 
specific problems in real earnest. However, Viktor Khristenko 
doubted the possibility of ending the aforesaid verbal 
squabbles, noting that the discussion will continue, as before, 
for the sake of attaining concrete solutions.
In real life, though, it's crystal clear that Gazprom and 
RAO UES should stop quarrelling once and for all. Virtually 
everyone, including Putin, advocated raising domestic gas 
prices. Anatoly Chubais didn't argue with the President, as he 
planned silently to raise electricity rates accordingly.
It has been decided to set up a joint commission for 
promptly tackling various pressing problems. This seems to be 
the most important result of the Sochi conference. In fact, 
neither Gazprom, nor RAO UES had created any such joint working 
structure in the past. Anatoly Chubais referred to this 
decision as a step forward, what with Rem Vyakhirev declining 
to comment on this new commission in any way. Such indifference 
on the part of the Gazprom head can be explained by two 
reasons. Vyakhirev apparently hopes to neutralize this 
commission by installing his own cronies, who would prevent any 
practical actions from within. Or he believes that this new 
structure will prove to be completely ineffective. Quite 
possibly, Vyakhirev is mistaken this time because Vladimir 
Putin is sick and tired of acting as a permanent "buffer" 
between this country's power workers and gas sector.
Incidentally, both RAO UES and Gazprom might well be overhauled 
prior to the next season.


******


#6
The Russia Journal
October 21-27, 2000
What fate for alternative service in Russia?
Many claim it’s guaranteed in Constitution
By Vladimir Mukhin, the military correspondent for Nezavisimaya Gazeta


One of the ongoing discussions in Russian society that flares up from time
to time is alternative military service. This debate has been going on for
seven years now, ever since a draft law on the subject was drawn up and
submitted to the lower house of parliament, the State Duma. Successive
Dumas examined the draft law at their meetings on several occasions, but in
the end, the previous Duma turned it down in spring 1999. 


New attempts are under way, however, to pass a law on alternative service.
Already in 1999, with the backing of Union of Right Forces (SPS), Duma
deputy Yuly Rybakov drafted a new version of the law. 


In the words of reserve Col. Gen. Eduard Vorobyev, a member of the Duma
Defense Committee, the new version was democratic in spirit, but the old
Duma didn’t want to examine it because the government had given it an
unfavorable assessment. But Rybakov won’t give up and wants to amend the
draft in line with the government’s comments and reintroduce it to the Duma.


The federal executive authorities have also been active, drafting their own
version of a law on alternative military service. The government is set to
introduce the law to the Duma in the coming weeks.


"The deputies could end up facing the dilemma of which draft law [SPS or
government] to examine, and then the debate would take off with new vigor,"
said Vorobyev, who headed a working group on the draft law in the old Duma. 


Vorobyev sees five or six main points over which debate will probably
center when the draft law comes up for discussion.


First is the question of whether religious or personal convictions should
serve as justification for doing alternative military service. Second, will
young men have to prove in some way that they hold, say, pacifist views, or
will a simple declaration be enough? Third, will service be performed in
the young man’s home region or elsewhere in the country? Fourth, will
alternative service be the same length as ordinary military service or
longer? Fifth, will the Defense Ministry and other security ministries have
any role in organizing alternative service? And finally, what should people
doing alternative service be paid?


The SPS draft law contains very liberal provisions that would guarantee the
rights and freedoms of young men doing alternative service. In practice,
this means that a young man would do his service close to home, be
adequately paid, and not serve too long, though the SPS draft law admits
that alternative service should be longer than the two years required for
military service. 


It’s hard to say to what extent the new Duma will support these ideas.
Certainly, the old Duma, where the Communists had a majority, rejected the
liberal law on alternative service. One of the most hardline of the
communist-nationalists, Albert Makashov, even said that no law on
alternative service is needed as it "could lead to the disintegration of
the Army." 


This kind of statement reflects the fear that everyone would want to do
alternative service, and there would be no one left to serve in the Army.
But military sociologists and officials at General Headquarters say these
fears are groundless. Col. Viktor Kozhushko of the department responsible
for organizing call up for military service said that with a carefully
thought-out law on alternative service, only 0.5 percent of all young men
eligible for military service would prefer alternative service. Kozhushko
did say, however, that a very liberal law would probably lead to more young
men wishing to do alternative service.


"We want a law on alternative service passed as soon as possible," said the
head of the department responsible for organizing the call-up, Col. Gen.
Vladislav Putilin. "But not much here depends on us. According to the
Constitution, the Defense Ministry can’t introduce laws. This is the
government’s prerogative, though, of course, we’re not indifferent to the
issue as it has an impact on the numbers of draftees available."


Putilin said that some young men cite the Constitution (Article 59, Point
3), which proclaims the right to do alternative service, as justification
for trying to dodge the draft.


"The legal vacuum just creates chaos," he said. "Some judges clear charges
against draft dodgers; others don’t, but this all has no effect. The public
is more and more aware of the need to solve this problem. The government
and security ministries are seriously preparing for alternative service.
The question now is, will our deputies take the issue just as seriously?
That’s what we don’t yet know," Putilin said.
*******


#7
Moscow Times
October 20, 2000 
Two Kopeks' Worth: Academic Excellence in School 132 
By Peter Ekman 


How do this nation's university students excel in all of the toughest 
subjects f mathematics, computer science and physics f when there are so many 
problems in higher education? In search of the answer, I visited School 132 
in Kostroma. 


In many ways the school appears to be fairly ordinary, teaching 900 students 
in grades one through 11. It's located in a working class neighborhood in a 
small economically depressed city 330 kilometers north of Moscow. But it has 
a tradition of academic excellence. Almost all graduates go on to higher 
education, either in Kostroma or in Moscow or St. Petersburg. I was invited 
to visit by a proud graduate f one of the best students I've ever taught. If 
Schools 132 can still produce graduates of the same quality, the future of 
Russian education may still be bright. 


The school building looks older than its 65 years and was recently damaged by 
fire. A plaque and a small howitzer mark the achievements of the Soviet army 
during World War II. One classroom doubles as a war museum. Inside the walls 
are brightly painted with murals and students enthusiastically greeted me. 


The base pay for the 70 teachers is 800 rubles ($29) per month for a 
19-hour-per-week teaching load. By teaching on top of her administrative 
work, the school's director earns 4,000 rubles per month. Parents contribute 
money through the parents association, but the director insists that the 
contributions are all voluntary. 


Contributions have provided basic teaching equipment, such as overhead 
projectors and computers. About 25 computers are available in two classrooms. 
They are mostly PC compatibles, but older models are still used. Eleventh 
grade students were programming graphics in Pascal when I entered one 
classroom, between class periods. I'd asked them to make a short presentation 
to better judge the students' abilities, but I'd been warned that students in 
the regions are never taught economics. These warnings were dead wrong. A 
20-minute discussion on the properties of money and on how capital moves 
through the economy convinced me that these students know more than many 
American university students know on these topics, and that they were not shy 
about showing their knowledge to a stranger. Having exhausted my Russian 
language notes, we talked about their future plans. Most of the students were 
resigned to leaving Kostroma in order to have a successful career. 


A 10th grade English class was only slightly less impressive. A couple of 
students spoke slowly but almost fluently in English, while the rest seemed 
shy about speaking to a stranger, giving short, but correct, answers to 
questions. 


Most of the teachers have stayed with the school for the last 10 years, but 
the program has changed. New textbooks are used, economics is taught, a 
specialty in biology was added to the traditional specialty in math, and more 
participative teaching methods are used. From the enthusiasm that students 
showed, it would seem difficult to stop them from participating in class. 


From my three-hour visit, it appears that School 132's graduates could excel 
in almost any U.S. university if they knew English better. Russia's 
educational future would be secure if every school and institute had such 
enthusiastic students and dedicated teachers. 


Peter Ekman is a financial educator based in Moscow. He welcomes e-mail at 
pdek@co.ru 


*******


#8
ECOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ECO-HR.197
October 19, 2000
Editor and Publisher: Lev A. Fedorov
e -mail: lefed@online.ru


Dictatorship of the Law?
THEY'RE STILL LOOKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SPIES IN VLADIVOSTOK
Grigorii Pasko
October 18, 2000


As usual, on October 17 I purchased several newspapers at the newsstand. In
one of them I read the report of a press conference held by Aleksandr
Savin, chairperson of the Primorskii Krai Committee for Natural Resources.
Savin had some interesting things to say. If you believe the article, he
uttered the following: "There are a number of environmental organizations,
primarily foreign ones, that are backed by special services and that act,
without basis, to slow down economic development, citing a need to expand
environmental protection activities."


It's a pity, of course, that Savin didn't provide any specific examples,
didn't cite any names or name any of the organizations "that are fronting
special services." Even so, the newspaper "Vladivostok" and its readers
should be able to guess who the environmental spies are.


Another newspaper, one that is extremely well known for its objectivity and
independence, dedicated an entire column to the thoughts (though the truth
be know, the thoughts were ponderously presented and not exactly in
Russian) of Nikolai Sotskov, Rear Admiral and Director of the Federal
Security Service (FSB) for the Pacific Fleet. Sotskov asserts that of late
his agency has noted "...specific activities of foreigners aimed at making
contact with military personnel who, by rank, are privy to information of
interest as well as having an opportunity to collect certain kinds of
closed information pertaining to their professional activities, for
example, of scientists and journalists in the Navy..." I did say, after
all, that the Russian in the article was pretty hard to read.


It's obvious that Sotskov wouldn't have provided any names. He once used me
as example of a "Japanese spy." But now he avoids any contact with me and
is probably afraid that the next court will force him to publicly apology
to me.


Sotskov, in this same article, unintelligibly and at long length, makes an
attempt to sternly criticize several articles that appeared in another
newspaper and he rather awkwardly defends Valerii Suchkov, a general and
Pacific Fleet military prosecutor. Understandably, Sotskov doesn't give the
names of those articles. He might possibly have in mind one of my articles
where I raise doubts about the outstanding professional qualities of the
fleet's prosecutor. In any case, Suchkov himself was much braver than the
Federal Security Service types. On that same October 17, a journalist told
me that he heard, in a telephone conversation, the following phrase from
Suchkov: "I won't calm down until Pasko is sitting in a cell." I figure
Suchkov will NEVER calm down. If the general really blurted out those
words, and I don't have any reason to doubt my 
colleague, then I truly am sorry for the prosecutor; he is clearly mixing
up personal matters with professional.


There are other facts that suggest to me that this is indeed the case: the
prosecutor's office, in the district where the editor who dared to
criticize the fleet's prosecutor has his office, spent nearly a week
shaking down the publisher's accounting department, carrying out a
"separate instruction" by the military prosecutor's office. They were
looking for anything that would prove I had violated some kind of law.
Understandable, they didn't find anything. Although they did have a time of
it; after all, they're in charge these days.


What is up with all this sudden activity by the guys at the security forces
and the prosecutor's office?


I think they're rather nervous about the upcoming session of the appeals
panel of the military collegium of the Russian Federation Supreme Court.
And they have reason to be nervous: professional judges can't help but
notice that the case the Pacific Fleet security service geeks slapped
together against me under the keen supervision of Suchkov isn't worth a
plugged nickel and could, and should, end in only one manner: a censure of
those who brought this case to the court in the first place. Of course,
there's no way the Sotskov-Suchkov types are going to want things to turn
out that way. But on the way to a rule of law society, it seems to me it's
high time for some examples of meting out punishment to those in
law-enforcement agencies who could care less about the law.


I'm not an idealist. I am simply trying to understand: does the
"dictatorship of the law" announced by our President apply to everyone or
only to those selected by the very representatives of this dictatorship?


Grigorii Mikhailovich Pasko
October 18, 2000
e-mail: pasko@marine.su


Translation: Staff Ink.


******


#9
Business Week
October 30, 2000
[for personal use only]
Letter From Armenia
Abandoning a Sinking Country (int'l edition)
By JANIN FRIEND 
Friend, a Dallas journalist, worked for a year in Armenia on a program to 
strengthen the independent press. 
EDITED BY SANDRA DALLAS 


Armenia's nine years of independence from the Soviet Union and its long 
enmity with neighboring Azerbaijan have not been kind to Sonya Toumanyan. She 
was already a widow when one of her four sons died after the Azeris bombed 
the southern city of Kapan, where Toumanyan lives, in 1992. Another decamped 
for Russia that same year, and her two remaining sons have since joined him.
At 67, Sonya Toumanyan is abandoned. She hasn't heard from her sons in two 
years. Family pictures line the walls of her shabby three-room apartment. She 
lives on bread she begs from shops. Fearful of the cold and dark, she spends 
almost all of her $6 a month pension to pay the electricity bill. An asthma 
sufferer, Toumanyan could hardly gasp out her story as she returned from the 
Armenian Red Cross, where she gets her medicine. ``I've wanted to throw 
myself off the balcony,'' she says, inhaler in hand. ``I was almost dying 
last night. I was calling to God.''
To Toumanyan, it must seem sometimes as if God is the only one left. 
Armenia is in danger of becoming one of the first modern nations abandoned by 
its own people. Some experts estimate that almost half of the population--3.7 
million a decade ago--has emigrated. In the wake of this mass exodus are 
towns and cities of silent streets, shuttered shops and offices, and 
desperate communities of the left behind--80% of them poor.
Kapan, once a flourishing industrial center, is especially hard-hit: Its 
population has dropped from 47,000 to 20,000 since independence. Its roads 
are lined with half-empty apartment blocks and abandoned factories. Its once 
noisy cafes are lifeless. In its open-air market, there are more sellers than 
buyers.
TRAPPED. Kapan is an isolated, shriveling city in an isolated, shriveling 
nation. Armenia never recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Hundreds of factories, scientific institutes, and businesses never 
reopened. In 1991, the new nation quickly went to war with neighboring 
Azerbaijan over its Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which had a large Armenian 
population. While a mid-1990s ceasefire has left Armenia in control of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas, Armenia now lives between two hostile 
neighbors: Azerbaijan to the east and Turkey to the west. Its borders with 
both are closed.
It's tempting to conclude that Armenia never had a chance. The exodus 
began even before independence, after an earthquake devastated the northern 
region in 1988. More Armenians departed when Azerbaijan imposed a road, rail, 
and energy blockade--and still more left to avoid the draft when war broke 
out. The Soviet collapse produced an army of jobless workers. The 
unemployment rate is now 40%, and the underemployment is staggering: Doctors 
work as doormen, and university lecturers clean offices for $5 a week.
Political instability has taken its toll, too. In October, 1999, terrorist 
gunmen killed Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and seven members of 
Parliament--prompting some Armenians to conclude that a transition to 
democracy and a market economy may never come to pass. Life, they believe, 
lies elsewhere.
For Avag Yepremian, it lies within. A 42-year-old poet, writer, and former 
publisher, Yepremian lives in Kapan and refuses to leave. His life, he says, 
is defined by the Armenian language. But like the city's impoverished 
survivors, who huddle in their apartments, Yepremian is in full retreat from 
Kapan's harsh realities. ``Ordinary life is so bad that we escape into our 
inner world,'' Yepremian tells me. Struggling to feed his wife and two 
children, he consoles himself with writing and reading. In the past year, he 
and his brother had to close their beloved newspaper. Since last year's 
political killings, Yepremian says, Kapan's emigration rate has doubled.
DESOLATION. Some 80% of those leaving head for relatively prosperous Russia, 
which doesn't require a visa. Most, like Sonya Toumanyan's sons, are 
working-age men. Often, the departed send money home or relocate their 
families when they find jobs. But some simply abandon those left behind: 
Sonya Toumanyan's sons fall into that category, too.
What remains is a breathtaking desolation. Most of Kapan's factories are 
useless now: They made military equipment, electronic components, and other 
products geared to the Soviet industrial system. Cows forage on garbage. 
Young women linger idly on park benches. ``It's an empty town,'' says Lilit 
Zacharian, 24. ``The young men go, and the young women stay.'' The main route 
out of Kapan is a mountainous road that is sprinkled with land mines. Still, 
people simply close the doors of their apartments, or sell them for as little 
as $600, and quietly board those buses. All over the country, people are 
desperate to get out any way they can.
In addition to Russia, many Armenians leave for Georgia, Turkey, and Iran, 
where they connect to other European, Middle Eastern, and Asian cities. About 
15% of those leaving end up in the U.S. and Europe. At the American Embassy, 
the line for tourist visas is more than 200 applicants long on the heaviest 
days. Many Armenians will get their visas, either to the U.S. or Europe, and 
never return from their vacations or business trips. Others have American 
companies help them get visas. Aram Hovhannisyan, 28, who has an advanced 
degree in physics and is fluent in Russian and English, cruised the Internet 
and landed a job with a software company in Florida. He decided to go 
overseas when the CARE office in Yerevan was scaled back and he lost his 
$400-a-month job maintaining the computer system. ``I have to think about my 
son,'' says Hovhannisyan, who is married and has a 16-month-old baby. ``There 
is no future in Armenia.''
In all of this, the government has many critics. Armenians love their 
homeland, they say, and many will return when jobs are available. But Yerevan 
has been too passive--and too disorganized--to halt the ruinous exodus, 
critics charge. Armenian officials are trying to boost tourism and promote 
technology parks to recapture something of the country's former role as a 
technology center during Soviet times. But few projects have been completed, 
and the economic and political crisis, coupled with widespread corruption, 
has scared off most foreign investors.
At this point, Armenia lives mostly on foreign loans and remittances. The 
U.S. has pumped $102 million into Armenia for the year to Sept. 30; the World 
Bank lent $60 million in the first six months of 2000. Armenians abroad send 
home more than $300 million annually, either to family members or as gifts 
for development projects.
Hanging over all of this are the tensions with Azerbaijan. Even now, 
Armenia's blocked borders cost the nation an estimated $62 million in annual 
exports. And peace talks with Azerbaijan, now five years old, have so far 
proved fruitless. The prospect of war is palpable. Should another erupt, 
Armenia, with few draft-age men, could lose the fight. ``We wanted more 
land,'' says Anahit Gjulbudaghian, a 27-year-old Armenian woman in Yerevan. 
``But now, all of our lands are empty.''


******


#10
The Brookings Review
Fall 2000 Vol. 18 No. 4
Russia
The U.S. Response to Changing Policy Imperatives
by Fiona Hill (fhill@brookings.edu) 
Fiona Hill is a fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program and 
Advisor on Strategic Planning to the Eurasia Foundation. She has written 
extensively on issues related to Russia, the states of the former Soviet 
Union, the Caucasus region, and the Caspian Basin.


The 1990s were a disappointing decade for Russia, marked by severe economic 
decline and two devastating wars in Chechnya. Internationally, with the 
collapse of the USSR, Russia lost much of its stature on the world stage, and 
Western countries made incursions into its former spheres of influence-most 
notably by expanding NATO and intervening militarily in the Balkans. As the 
21st century opens, the Russian state seems barely capable of the most basic 
political, social, and economic functions and incapable of projecting power 
abroad. 


In the wake of the Cold War, Russia is still trying to reposition itself in 
its single most important relationship, that with the United States, and to 
define a new role regionally and globally. The greatest fear of Russian 
leaders, intent on retaining Russia's position as a great power, is to see 
their state relegated to the status of a "third world" country-"Upper Volta 
with missiles," as one Russian commentator once put it. The quest for 
international respect will pose major challenges for a new U.S. 
administration seeking to manage the relationship with Russia. 


Russians have put much store in their new president, Vladimir Putin, who is 
promising to bring stability and prosperity at home and respect abroad. Putin 
is a product of the Russian political elite-a state functionary affiliated 
with the security services, plucked from relative obscurity by Kremlin 
insiders, and then designated to replace the ailing Boris Yeltsin and send a 
strong message to the outside world. His ascendancy represented a statement 
on behalf of all Russians that "we will henceforth define our own political 
and economic path." As a result, Putin will be forced to chart a policy 
course among the shoals of elite and public opinion and the competing demands 
of powerful political factions to whom he is beholden. 


New Policy Imperatives in Russia


Stability and control have supplanted marketization and democratization as 
Russia's policy imperatives. Stability, in the form of peace, security, and 
legal order, has been repeatedly singled out in public opinion polls as the 
overriding goal of the Russian people. Control implies reestablishing a 
centralized, paternalistic government that will check the chaotic devolution 
of authority to Russia's regions, strengthen the powers of the presidency, 
increase state regulation of the economy, and boost the powers of law 
enforcement agencies, the security services, and the armed forces to combat 
crime and corruption and threats from separatists. 


Government policy actions this year have been consistent with these 
imperatives. To date, they have included the restoration of the Presidential 
Security Council as the primary decisionmaking body; the reduction of the 
powers of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia's parliament; 
legislative attempts to enable Putin to remove regional governors; the 
creation of seven super regions in the Russian Federation and the direct 
appointment of presidential representatives to supervise them; and decrees to 
bring regional and federal laws into conformity. These measures have been 
complemented by the determined pursuit of the war in Chechnya to overcome the 
national humiliation of defeat there in 1996; the resurgence of the FSB, 
successor to the KGB; detentions and arrests of researchers, journalists, and 
oligarchs perceived to be acting contrary to state interests; and increasing 
restrictions on press freedoms. 


The Russian political elite sees economic development as the best way to 
strengthen the state and restore Russia's international position. To succeed, 
Putin must deliver on the economy. But with Russia's economy-dysfunctional 
and mutant, with a logic and rules all its own-only a conscious, 
comprehensive reform effort has even a chance to work. Serious reform would 
require a leadership that understands the current system and is willing and 
able to tackle it in all its complexity. But dismantling the existing economy 
would make Russia unstable, weak, and vulnerable for years-clearly an 
unacceptable prospect. So the Putin administration must find ways to achieve 
economic growth at minimal cost to political and social stability. That may 
be possible for a time. By building on the devaluation of the ruble after the 
1998 financial crisis and on profits from high oil and gas prices and by 
stemming the direct looting of government resources and the squandering of 
budgetary funds, Putin could spur short-term growth. But long-term economic 
health-sustainable high rates of growth capable of supporting Russia's 
reemergence as a major power-is highly unlikely. 


Emphasizing the economy has implications for Russia's foreign policy, as 
outlined in the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs doctrine produced in July. It 
means securing a breathing space and minimizing difficulties abroad. It also 
means stressing commercial and trade issues, obtaining debt relief, 
attracting foreign investment, and emphasizing cooperation with international 
economic and political structures such as the European Union. But the U.S. 
relationship remains crucial for Russia. Moscow will seek to regularize 
high-level contacts while working to limit any deployment of missile defense, 
prevent any significant change in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and 
discourage any further enlargement of NATO-especially one that might 
encompass the Baltic states. Russia will also want to assert itself in 
geographic areas that have been declared national priorities, including the 
Baltics, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea. The 
latter area with its energy reserves is particularly important to Russian 
economic interests. 


Chechnya will remain a sticking point. The war is a defining moment for 
Russia. It is an ethnic war where a minority has been brutally 
persecuted-irrespective of the merits of the stated goal of countering 
terrorism. The approach is an explosive one for a multiethnic state. Although 
Russia is more than 80 percent ethnic Russian, it is also home to many 
non-Russians-around 27 million people from some 100 different ethnic groups. 
Although other secessions along the lines of Chechnya are unlikely, it will 
be hard to consolidate the state around a national core when many non-ethnic 
Russians who are Russian citizens have perished at the hands of the national 
army. Widespread disaffection among non-Russians (especially Muslim groups), 
suspicion of the ethnic Russian chauvinism of the center, and more rather 
than less instability seem the likely result. 


Chechnya is more important for relations with the United States than it may 
initially seem from the point of view of U.S. national interests. It reveals 
much about the likely nature of Russian policy under Putin and some of the 
difficulties and dangers that Russia faces. That the war has raged amidst 
planning for liberal economic reforms indicates that Putin's policies will be 
both progressive and regressive from the U.S. perspective. Economic reform 
and pragmatic relations with the West may be pursued while domestic dissent 
is stifled in the name of establishing strong central state control. 
Furthermore, the war in Chechnya is an important policy tool for the Putin 
government. It is not just a counterterrorism operation or simply a national 
tragedy. It is a projection of state power, no matter how flawed its 
execution. 


This duality will make it increasingly difficult for a new U.S. 
administration to reconcile the universal principles and values Americans 
hold dear-human rights, democratization, and integration of the world 
economy-with the strategic imperatives of relations with Russia. If U.S. 
interests in Russia are defined by a new administration as ensuring human 
rights and establishing an open, liberal market economy, then the United 
States and Russia will likely clash on fundamental issues of values. Russia 
will represent a threat simply because it will itself be an exception in both 
cases. 


Maintaining an accurate image of post-Cold War Russia will be essential for a 
new administration. Russia is like Great Britain and France after World War 
II, a former great power in the throes of decay that has lost both an empire 
and the means to preserve its crowning achievements. As the sinking of the 
Kursk nuclear submarine and the catastrophic fire in the Ostankino television 
tower both illustrated last August, the imperial military legacy and 
infrastructure cannot be maintained on a shoestring. Rebirth is many years in 
the future, if ever, and Russian policymakers will face hard choices about 
where ultimately to apply the state's scarce resources. Meanwhile, Russia has 
the capacity to cause great harm both to U.S. interests through its nuclear 
arsenal and technology exports and to its own people and the states around 
it-especially those to the South. Russia is likely to be a negative rather 
than a positive power for the foreseeable future, posing more problems than 
opportunities for U.S. policymakers. 


Preserving Appearances


Still, certain approaches to managing the relationship can safeguard U.S. 
priorities. Given Russia's desire to be accorded respect internationally, and 
taken seriously by the United States in particular, symbolism and appearances 
are key. Skillful diplomacy will be required to ensure that Russia perceives 
no diminution of status in its relations with Washington. The attention now 
paid to Russia should continue, even if form rather than substance dominates 
summit meetings in the future. Consultation, dialogue, and the semblance of 
cooperation will be crucial. 


Missile defense is likely to be a central issue. The United States should 
make an earnest effort to gain Russian support for (and participation in) any 
transition to a world of greater missile defense. At least in principle, that 
should be possible, as no defense being contemplated by the United States 
would threaten Russia's nuclear status. But if Russia cannot be brought 
along, then any abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should be 
done as openly as possible to minimize the impact on the overall relationship 
and to preserve prospects for mutual reductions in nuclear arsenals. The same 
approach applies to NATO enlargement, which should be presented as a 
technical issue-when countries meet the specific and rigorous criteria for 
inclusion, they can join. No one is excluded, not even Russia. 


A somewhat different approach will be required with regard to the conflict in 
Chechnya, which is likely to drag on as a guerrilla war. A new U.S. 
administration, like its predecessor, will want to emphasize that criticism 
of Russia's conduct in the conflict, including how it treats its own 
citizens, does not challenge its territorial integrity. But the United States 
must be careful not to make common cause with the slaughter of Russian 
citizens, while supporting legitimate action against activities by terrorist 
groups in the region. 


This leads to the question of policy linkage. If Russia must distinguish 
between countering terrorism and brutalizing civilians in Chechnya, the 
United States must also delink its priority issues like nuclear 
nonproliferation from Chechnya. Washington must protect its own vital 
interests and not compromise on them-by, for example, cutting funding to 
programs in Russia that enhance the security of nuclear installations-as part 
of sanctions against Russian conduct in Chechnya. At the same time, the 
United States must also speak out consistently and firmly when fundamental 
values are challenged through political repression, including a crackdown on 
Russian civic organizations, or brutal reprisals against minority groups. 
Russia is now integrated with the West to such an extent that if it is 
allowed to diverge from standards of human rights, rule of law, and 
democracy, promoting these values elsewhere will be difficult. 


Russia's domestic affairs have their own dynamics. The United States can no 
longer make shaping Russia's economy and polity in its own image the focus of 
its Russia policy. But support for indigenous Russian efforts to liberalize 
and reform the economy and politics-especially in Russia's regions-should 
continue. Such support is a sign of commitment to the state's overall 
development rather than an attempt to impose prepackaged Western formulas, 
and will help build a reservoir of good will toward the United States. On the 
macroeconomic level, continued assistance, debt relief, and loans should be 
contingent on real evidence of reforms in areas where aid is to be applied. 


A new U.S. administration must bear in mind that Russia's current predicament 
will certainly continue far beyond its term in office. A host of pressing 
issues-not only comprehensive economic reform and resolving the ongoing war 
in Chechnya, but also military reform, Russia's demographic and health 
crisis, and severe environmental degradation-have been and will continue to 
be neglected in the name of stability. All require hard choices that will 
rupture national consensus and destabilize the polity. They cannot be 
neglected forever. Over the long term, the United States will be dealing with 
a continuously weakened Russia, even though it may have acquired some 
superficial attributes of a stronger state. 


******* 


#11
The Washington Post
October 23, 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin Displays More Cautious Leadership
Role in Kursk, Mideast Crises Recast Russian's Bold Image
By David Hoffman


MOSCOW, Oct. 22- A series of misjudgments, hesitations and retreats by 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks have cast a new light on his 
leadership, suggesting he is more cautious and inward-looking than previously 
thought. 


Putin's awkward and slow reaction to the sinking of the submarine Kursk, his 
uncertainty about how to deal with fast-paced events in Yugoslavia and his 
absence from the Middle East peace conference in Egypt have all contributed 
to a sense of indecision.


That is a sharp contrast to last year, when he first appeared on the 
political stage and was cast as a man of action in the wake of apartment 
house bombings in Moscow and other cities. Blaming Chechen rebels, he 
launched a military offensive in secessionist Chechnya that earned him a 
reputation for decisiveness--and sky-high opinion poll ratings.


But recently Putin has shown a different face, less bold and more opaque. He 
also has been facing challenges to his authority from outside the Kremlin, 
primarily from a group of governors who have started a fresh counteroffensive 
against Putin's campaign to curb their powers.


The latest questions about Putin arose from his absence from the Middle East 
peace talks in Sharm el-Sheikh. Russia had been a sponsor of the peace 
process since the 1991 Madrid conference. Its participation and influence had 
waned, however, and the United States apparently was not enthusiastic about 
inviting Putin to the hastily arranged meeting.


Still, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov had made a four-day visit to the region 
just before the peace conference, and until the final hours the Foreign 
Ministry and the Kremlin issued conflicting statements about whether Putin 
might go. Officials said there was a behind-the-scenes struggle between the 
Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin Security Council about the wisdom of 
attending, with the latter suggesting it would be better not to go.


At the last minute, Putin flew to Sochi, on the Black Sea, rather than to 
Egypt, and dispatched the chairman of the Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, an 
increasingly influential adviser, for a visit to Iran. Analysts said the move 
suggested Putin was more interested in asserting Russia's regional interests 
with Iran than its great-power ambitions.


"Russia was not invited to Sharm el-Sheikh not because it did not have a 
position of its own, but because they managed to make do without Russia 
there," said Boris Makarenko, deputy director of the Center for Political 
Technologies, a political analysis group here. "Here, Putin encountered the 
objective reality. Russia has lost the status of a great power, and they 
managed to do without it in a critical situation. Nobody had a solution, not 
the United States and not Europe."


Putin also was extremely cautious in Yugoslavia and seemed to be slow to 
react as the forces of Vojislav Kostunica toppled the president, Slobodan 
Milosevic. Despite Russia's traditional ties and interests in Serbia, Putin 
sent Ivanov to Belgrade only at the last minute, and Ivanov arrived on the 
day Kostunica triumphed.


"It was the obvious mistake of Russian diplomacy and presidential foreign 
policy," Makarenko said.


At home, Putin has been less visible and seemingly more uncertain than a year 
ago, when he championed a new military offensive in Chechnya. When the Kursk 
went down, he remained on vacation in Sochi rather than returning promptly to 
Moscow, and he appeared to be out of touch with the shock the country felt at 
the loss. His popularity ratings took a slight dip, but he still enjoys high 
approval in most opinion polls.


Putin also has come across as a detached president who operates behind closed 
doors. He has not had a full-fledged news conference this year, and in recent 
months he has preferred brief comments at photo opportunities or closed 
sessions for selected journalists with Kremlin officials who cannot be quoted 
by name.


However, Putin is said by some Russian officials to follow his public image 
intensely, which was one reason for his campaign against media magnate 
Vladimir Gusinsky after Gusinsky's television channel criticized Putin. A 
recent visitor noted that his meeting was delayed so Putin could watch the 
latest television news, which he reportedly does several times a day.


Meanwhile, some governors have in recent days become more outspoken in their 
opposition to Putin's attempts to reimpose more control on the regions from 
Moscow. The governors are discussing a possible Constitutional Court 
challenge.


Putin has proposed abolishing the upper house of parliament, made up of 
governors and regional legislative leaders, and he has installed seven 
overlords to supervise the regions, drawing protests from the elected 
governors that their powers are being usurped. At first, the governors 
responded meekly, but some powerful, well-known governors are becoming more 
outspoken.


Eduard Rossel of Sverdlovsk complained last week that the Kremlin was trying 
to replace local prosecutors and customs officials with its own choices.


His experienced people are being replaced by "someone who used to manage 
three chickens," he lamented. President Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan, a 
region just west of the Ural Mountains, said he would not permit such actions 
and would first "cut all the telephone lines" to Moscow.


******