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FEATURED ARTICLE

Arbitration:Wiping Out Consumers Rights?
BY Hossam M. Fahmy

The use of consumer arbitration is increasing rapidly. Many companies, banks, corporations, and retail stores choosing arbitration over trials are adding mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts with their clients. The use of consumer arbitration expanded eight years ago when Bank of America initiated its current policy.1 At that time notices of the new arbitration requirements were sent along with monthly statements to 12 million customers, encouraging thousands of other companies to follow the same policy. A growing number of companies are requiring their customers to agree to use arbitration, and not the courts, to resolve disputes. First USA Bank, the largest issuer of Visa Cards, with 58 million customers, began requiring mandatory arbitration in 1997. In April 1999, American Express took the lead among many other credit card companies turning to arbitration clauses.2 Edward Anderson, the managing director of the National Arbitration Forum, one of the nation’s major arbitration providers and the company selected by American Express to resolve any disputes, was quoted acknowledging, “People who draft contracts have been including [mandatory-arbitration provisions] like popcorn.”3

According to Jim Michaels, managing counsel in the Federal Reserve Board’s (Fed) division of consumer affairs, the Fed is looking carefully at the use of arbitration clauses in all consumer credit agreements including mortgages and car loans, to make sure “consumers are not being deprived of their rights.”4 According to the American Arbitration Association, the nation’s oldest and largest arbitration organization, 95,143 disputes were filed in 1998, up 20 percent from 1997.5

Companies contend they are turning to mandatory arbitration in an effort to resolve disputes more quickly and less expensively than they could through a court settlement. Supporters of arbitration clauses say that along with helping to unclog the courts, such clauses provide benefits for companies and customers alike by reducing the time and expense of resolving disputes. Peter Magnani, a spokesman for Bank of America, stated “‘Our goal and our customers’ goal is the same. … We want to see a fair and just resolution as quickly and inexpensively as possible.’”6

This appears to be a logical and fair explanation for Bank of America’s actions, however, less magnanimous forces may also be at work. Companies, banks, merchants, and corporations may also be attracted by the opportunity to reduce the risk of high jury awards as well as reduce legal costs.

Banks that have used arbitration in commercial transactions report that their overall legal costs were reduced.7 Most mandatory arbitration clauses eliminate choices for consumers by turning contracts into adhesion contracts that require compulsory arbitration.8 Companies and corporations tend to add mandatory arbitration clauses in the fine print of contracts, often in ways that are nearly invisible to all but the most careful readers.9 Other companies wipe out customer’s right to sue by sending out notices of new arbitration requirements in the form of envelope stuffers.10 The clauses may also be buried in a pile of documents a consumer is asked to sign quickly during settlement, or tacked to the back of a sales receipt.

Even the most ardent critics of mandatory arbitration acknowledge that the process can be helpful. Infact, properly employed and structured mandatory arbitration can be quite useful.11 As Mark Budnitz, professor of law at Georgia State University and a strong critic of mandatory arbitration clauses, said, “‘There’s no question that arbitration is an excellent, wonderful dispute-resolution device.’ … But if it’s so good for consumers, then why don’t companies make such provisions ‘very clear and explain everything to consumers,’ and not try to hide the terms in bill stuffers or a pile of documents?”12 The answe r is that results are not generally good for consumers. Mandatory arbitration clauses are designed to protect companies from suits and high juridical awards and minimize compensation a consumer can receive.

An example is the following clause sent by American Express to clients in April 1999:

By using this card after June 1, any disagreements will have to be submitted to an arbitration company selected by American Express. The decisions will be final and binding and can’t be appealed unless an award is for more than $100,000. Taking a closer look at this clause and analyzing its mandatory arbitration clause:
  1. Cardholders lose the right to sue American Express after June 1.
  2. American Express has the exclusive right to choose the arbitrator. Plaintiffs do not have the same right.
  3. The decision is final and binding and can not be appealed by card holders unless the award is for more than $100,000.
Keeping in mind that American Express has a 30 days billing cycle, the dispute is likely to be due to a monthly bill. The number of card holders that have a credit line of more than $100,000 is substantially limited and those card holders are not likely to challenge such an award.

Assuming that American Express has an internal policy that card holder compensation should not exceed the amount of $100,000, AMEX is likely to be the party challenging the award, not a consumer. Looking at the terms of the clause, it is not difficult to predict that most of the clause terms are in favor of American Express.

Companies, banks, merchants, and corporations, who are usually repeat players in arbitration and favor these clauses, tend to spend a lot of money specifically designing their forms of dispute resolution procedures.13 The companies, by designing their own arbitration procedures, have subtly tilted the playing field in their favor.

In interpreting the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act,14 the U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that government policy favors arbitration over litigation so long as the process is fair.15 It is worth saying that this law was originally intended to encourage arbitration between businesses, however courts have actively expanded the law’s scope to include disputes between a business and its consumers.16

In a recent case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, a purchaser of a mobile home and a resident of Alabama brought a purported class action against the lender, asserting claims that the lender had violated the Truth in Lending Act by failing to disclose as a finance charge the Vendor’s Single Interest insurance requirement. She also alleged that petitioners violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The agreement provided that all disputes arising from, or relating to, the contract, whether arising under case law or statutory law would be resolved by binding arbitration.17

The purchaser contended that the arbitration agreement’s silence with respect to costs created a risk that she will be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs, and thereby be unable to vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration.18 The Supreme Court ruled in December 2000 against the purchaser, holding that an order compelling arbitration and dismissing a party’s underlying claims is a “final decision with respect to an arbitration” within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act, and is thus immediately appealable.19 The court also held that an arbitration agreement that does not mention arbitration costs and fees is not per se unenforceable on the theory that it fails to affirmatively protect a party from potentially steep arbitration costs.20

This ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court simply means that a party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims at issue.21 It also means that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that it would be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.22

Courts tend to treat consumers as if they have willingly contracted for private dispute resolution by signing the contract and thereby have accepted the terms in it. For example, the Seventh Circuit ruled in 1997 that a purchaser of a computer system directly from the manufacturer was subject to the arbitration clause enclosed in the box in which the computer was shipped.23 The consumer argued that he was not aware of the clause because it was not prominently displayed, but the court held that by failing to read the documents, the consumer had accepted the manufacturer’s terms.24

Consumers challenging mandatory arbitration clauses have achieved limited success. One of the rare successful cases against Gateway shows clearly that companies, in an attempt to protect themselves, even make it difficult for the customers to apply for arbitration under their rules. In that case, the customer was unable to reach the computer maker’s promised round-the-clock helpline and did not accept the terms in the mandatory arbitration clause requiring that all disputes be handled by the rules of the ICC that require customers to pay $4,000 in advance for claims involving $50,000 or less. The customer challenged the provision in state court, arguing that the arbitration fees would almost double the cost of his $2,500 computer, and thus were unconscionable. A New York appeals court agreed, and ordered that the dispute be handled by another arbitrator with more moderate fees.25

Courts also tend to look with disapproval on laws viewed as unfairly hostile to arbitration, which are usually challenged by companies opposing any attempt to regulate the use of clauses including changes in font size, terms, and the use of these clauses. In 1999, the Supreme Court invalidated a Montana statute that mandated how companies had to disclose the use of arbitration.26

The same companies that are strong supporters of arbitration when it favors their causes, are willing to dispose of arbitration and favor litigation if it is in their best interest.

A clear example of this is that customers of Kaiser Permanete Co., which operates HMO plans in 17 states, can encounter different arbitration polices depending on where they live. The company currently uses arbitration in Massachusetts, California, and Colorado. In the other 14 states, Kaiser customers can sue for malpractice or any other grievance.27

The company’s given reason for using arbitration in some states but not others is that state laws are different. But arbitration experts strongly believe that the company simply assessed whether it would fare better financially in a courtroom or in arbitration.28 One writer has suggested that the contracted basis of arbitration is lost when consent between the parties is not real or where great power disparities exist between the parties.29

Several general characteristics are discernible under mandatory arbitration clauses. The system undoubtedly gives certain advantages to repeat players to maximize their long-term gains over consumers who may seek justice but participate with fewer resources.30 In arbitration, a consumer has limited information and to speed up the deliberation process the rights of discovery are generally limited. Such restrictions clearly put consumers at a disadvantage because they cannot search for company records that may establish a pattern of harm. This means that illegal actions by companies, banks, and merchants can go undetected, such as the practice uncovered in recent class action suits in which many retailers were improperly trying to collect debts that already had been forgiven in bankruptcy proceedings.31 As Professor Budnitz has commented, “The public cannot get the information to protect themselves, the way they can if there was a trial.”32

Repeat players are more able to mobilize legal and other resources to maximize long-term gain and use arbitration to their advantage. In disputes that take place between merchants and single consumers, the informality usually works against the one-time player customers.

The fact that repeat players insist on mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts and relations with customers, clients, and patients, confirms the doubts about such repeat players. Several lawsuits have already unsuccessfully challenged the bias of presumed repeat players. According to Tomme Fent, an Oklahoma lawyer, most arbitration costs are not so extreme, but high enough to deter complaints. In almost all parts of the country, it can cost $80 to $100 to file a case in court, however in arbitration cases consumers sometimes have to pay hundreds of dollars just to file a complaint and then more for the cost of the arbitrators, whose fees can range from $600 to $1,600 a day.33

Fent further contends that she usually wins these disputes in court, but has never won one in arbitration. “[A]s soon as people walk into the door with an arbitration clause,” said Fent, “I tell them their chances are no better than 50-50 and it will cost them a significant sum of money just to take the chance. A lot of clients are willing to take the chance but the costs are what makes it prohibitive.”34

Conclusion
Fent is probably optimistic about the 50-50 chance of consumers. The costs of filing for arbitration is high compared to trial and the arbitration clause itself might include higher costs. With such low odds of winning cases that challenge an arbitration clause, lawyers who represent consumers may no longer be willing to take arbitration cases on a contingency-fee basis. Consumers may end up with nowhere to go. Unable to file in court, they are priced out of arbitration, and the companies are insulated from any liabilities. Mandatory arbitration clauses are designed to protect the best interest of those companies, to deprive consumers from their right to sue, to minimize the amount of compensation the consumer may receive in court, and to lower the overall legal cost of their companies. Mandatory arbitration clauses do not generally benefit consumers.

The advantages of arbitration for repeat players will continue to increase over time as companies become more skillful at navigating the procedure.

Recommendations
  • For consumers who do not want to lose their right to sue, the only recourse is to refuse to do business with any company that requires mandatory arbitration. However that is increasingly difficult because more and more companies are requiring it.
  • Customers should inspect contracts and purchase agreements to determine if they contain an arbitration clause and pay special attention to any provisions that request travel to resolve a dispute.
  • To avoid an arbitration clause governing a bank account or a credit card, consumers likely will have to take their business elsewhere.
  • When presented with an arbitration form by an insurance agent or a doctor, consumers should ask if they will be treated without signing it.
  • Individuals should try to negotiate over arbitration clauses in certain private transactions.35
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a professor of law at the University of California at Los Angeles, said that after arranging to lease her house through a real estate agent she reviewed the contract only to discover that it had an arbitration clause. Menkel-Meadow determined to preserve her option to sue, crossed out the arbitration paragraphs. “ I’m an expert in the field, and I don’t want someone else making my choices for me,” she said.36 The agent accepted the change. Her advice to consumers is to try to negotiate, you might be surprised when it works.37 Reforms are needed to alter power relations between the parties:
  • Class actions and aggregations of claimants can make some one-time players more like repeat players.38 An example is organizational client groups and litigation strategies.
  • The use of repeat-player lawyers committed to particular social changes objectives and not just to professional roles.39
  • There are ways of converting one-shotters into repeat players in the system. Applying these reforms might seem like an easy task, yet it is not, for social changes depend more on conventional party and judicial politics than social structure.40
  • The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) needs to be amended41 to protect important rights of the one-time player consumers who cannot effectively bargain with a repeat-play contractor.42
  • The consumer area clearly needs the kind of rigorous examination of the repeat player and one-shot ADR outcome evaluations.

Notes
  1. Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1997, at A1.
  2. Caroline E. Mayer, You Can’t Sue Us, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 22, 1999, at A01.
  3. Id.
  4. Id.
  5. Id.
  6. Meier, supra, at A1.
  7. Id.
  8. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO St. J. on Disp. Resol. 19, 31 (1999).
  9. See, e.g., Mayer, supra, at A01, (American Express put notice of contract change in statement insert).
  10. Meier, supra, at A1.
  11. Mayer, supra, at A01.
  12. Id.
  13. Menkel-Meadow, supra, at 33-34
  14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1999).
  15. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81 (2000), See also Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1997, at A1 (comments of Professor Jean Sternlight).
  16. E.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983).
  17. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. 79, at 82-84.
  18. Id. at 84.
  19. Id. at 86-87.
  20. Id. at 89.
  21. Id. at 90.
  22. Id. at 91-92.
  23. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
  24. Id. at 1148-49.
  25. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 569, 571 (N.Y.A.D. 1st Dept. 1998).
  26. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). See also Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1997, at A1 (discussing this case and its impact on the lower court’s decision in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.)
  27. See, e.g., Meier, supra, at A1.
  28. Id.
  29. Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 brook. L. Rev. 1335, 1349-56 (1996).
  30. See Marc Galanter, “ Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal changes, 9 L. & Soc’y Rev. (1974).
  31. See Mayer, supra, at A01.
  32. Meier, supra, at A1.
  33. Mayer, supra, at A01.
  34. Id.
  35. Meier, supra, at A1.
  36. Id.
  37. Id.
  38. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 230-234 (1998) (controversial report of the role of Solicitor General in some hotly contested cases).
  39. See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND 122-35 (1989) (encouraging private foundations, governments, and the bar to support attorneys engaged in public interest law).
  40. SeeGERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 66-69 (1992) (discussing methods of effecting social change).
  41. See Richard Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1069, 1093-94 (1998) (draft of Federal Consumer Arbitration Act).
  42. Id. at 1091-92.

Gisela Bradley is the director of the State Bar of Texas Law Office Management Program.
 
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