A/RES/45/57
54th plenary meeting
4 December 1990
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
A
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical
weapons and to their destruction,
Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly in the light of the past
use of and recent threats to use chemical weapons, of strict observance by all
States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,
Welcoming again in this regard the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration
of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other
Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, of the importance
and continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol,
Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which
incorporates, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons, and expressing the hope that the consultations scheduled for the
inter-sessional period will move the negotiations forward,
Convinced of the necessity that every effort be exerted for the
successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their
destruction,
Emphasizing the importance of the widest possible participation of States
in the negotiations on the draft convention in order to ensure universal
adherence on its conclusion, and, in this regard, commending the ever growing
number of States participating in those negotiations,
Conscious of the need to share data relevant to the negotiations on a
future convention banning all chemical weapons on a global basis and of the
fact that the provision of such data would be an important confidence-building
measure,
Noting the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing
exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on
issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,
Welcoming, in this regard, the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America have agreed to cease the production
of chemical weapons and to begin destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles,
Welcoming also the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the
earliest conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction
and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to
contribute directly to that goal,
Noting with appreciation the increasing number of States that have
declared their intention to be among the original signatories to the
convention,
Recognizing that the effectiveness of such a convention will benefit from
the support and co-operation of the chemical industry,
1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and
objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, and to abide by the commitments undertaken in the Final Declaration
of the Paris Conference;
2. Notes the progress made in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1990 session, and
the results recorded in the Committee's report;
3. Expresses its regret and concern that a convention on the
prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded;
4. Strongly urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of highest
priority, to intensify during its 1991 session its efforts to resolve
outstanding issues, and to conclude its negotiations on a convention, taking
into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and to
re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose;
5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General
Assembly at its forty-sixth session on the results of its negotiations;
6. Stresses the particular significance and importance of declarations
made by States on whether or not they possess chemical weapons and of further
international exchanges of data and other relevant information in connection
with the negotiations on such a convention;
7. Encourages all States to take further initiatives, measures and
steps to promote confidence and openness in order to contribute to an early
agreement on, and universal adherence to, such a convention;
8. Invites all States to make every effort to ensure its early entry
into force and its effective implementation;
9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth
session the item entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".
B
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction and preparations for the Third Review Conference of
the Parties to the Convention
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it
commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction,
Taking note of the confidence-building measures agreed upon by the Second
Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, held at Geneva from 8 to
26 September 1986, for further strengthening the authority of the Convention
and for enhancing confidence among States,
Acknowledging that the Final Declaration of the Second Review
Conference expressed the need to give further consideration to, inter alia,
the implementation of the Convention in all its aspects,
Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the
effectiveness of the Convention to promote confidence and co-operation among
Member States as well as the necessity to comply with the obligations set
forth in the Convention,
1. Notes that, at the request of the States parties, a Third Review
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction will be held at Geneva in 1991, that,
following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee for that
Conference has been formed, open to all parties to the Convention, and that
the committee will meet at Geneva from 8 to 12 April 1991;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance
and to provide such services as may be required for the Third Review
Conference and its preparation;
3. Recalls in that regard the decision taken at the Second Review
Conference that the Third Review Conference should consider, inter alia, the
issues set out in article XII of the Final Declaration of the Second Review
Conference;
4. Reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention to
participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final
Declaration of the Second Review Conference and to provide such information
and data in conformity with the standardized procedure to the
Secretary-General on an annual basis and not later than 15 April;
5. Also recalls its request in resolution 44/115 C of 15 December 1989
that the Secretary-General should render the necessary assistance and should
provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the
relevant parts of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference;
6. Further recalls its request in resolution 44/115 C that the
Secretary-General should circulate to the States parties to the Convention not
later than four months prior to the convening of the Third Review Conference a
report on the implementation of these confidence-building measures;
7. Calls upon all States that have not ratified or acceded to the
Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of
universal adherence to the Convention and to the strengthening of
international confidence.
C
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: measures
to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
The General Assembly,
Recalling its previous resolutions, and those adopted by the Security
Council, on the use of chemical weapons,
Reaffirming its resolution 44/115 B of 15 December 1989 on measures to
uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion
of a chemical weapons convention,
Bearing in mind the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration of the
Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested
States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, of the importance and the
continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol,
Deploring the use and threat of use of chemical weapons,
1. Condemns vigorously all actions that violate or threaten to violate
the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods
of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant provisions
of international law;
2. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and
objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and reaffirms the vital necessity of
upholding its provisions;
3. Endorses the proposals of the group of qualified experts established
in pursuance of its resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987 concerning
technical guidelines and procedures to guide the Secretary-General in the
conduct of timely and efficient investigation of the reports of use of
chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;
4. Notes the continuing significance of the Security Council decision
to consider immediately, taking into account the investigations of the
Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, should there be any future use of chemical
weapons in violation of international law.
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